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ABSTRACT 
 
Phillip Wicksteed’s ideas played an important role in the history of economic 
methodology. This is because of two reasons: The first was that his views 
represent the starting point of the deliberate attempt to expel normative issues 
from marginalist economic analysis. The second reason was that his ideas 
influenced his disciple L. Robbins, who was one of the first theorists to set the 
methodological basis for an allegedly value-free economic science. The paper 
examines Wicksteed’s conception of a positive economic science and the role 
of normative aspects. In the same context, his views on the nature and the 
role of economic man, and his analysis of selfish and altruistic behaviour are 
also discussed. Finally, the work combines the above with Wicksteed’s 
economic methodology in order to asses his overall role and influence on the 
development of  the  trend towards a value-free economic theory.   
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I. Introduction 
 
 
Towards the end of the 19th century there were the first clear signs of  
the tendency to expel normative issues from economic theory. The growing 
influence of positivism, with its emphasis on the rejection of  all non-scientific 
elements from scientific theory, was the main cause of this tendency. The first 
generation marginalists had also been influenced by earlier versions of 
positivism, but their economic theories contained substantial value judgments 
and  normative elements (for discussions  of  this issue see  Gordon, 1977; 
Drakopoulos 1997). This tendency was reinforced by the enormous success 
of  physics as a science  and its prestigious status among scientific 
disciplines. Many economic theorists saw the imitation of classical physics 
methodology as  ideal if  economics was to become an established scientific 
field  (for a discussion of the influence of physics on economics see Mirowski, 
1989 and Drakopoulos, 1994). The essential prerequisite for a physics-type 
methodology was the  rejection of all normative elements from scientific 
economic thought. The works of  P. Wicksteed, V. Parero and I. Fisher can be 
seen as the first systematic attempts towards this direction. Wicksteed’s 
explicit reservations about utilitarianism and hedonism, Pareto’s use of “given” 
and thus allegedly psychology-free indifference curves, and Fisher’s critique 
of the concept of utility as being unscientific, are strong indications of the 
above trend.  
 Philip Wicksteed’s work was a representative example of the attempt to 
construct an economic theory free from all  normative and metaphysical 
elements. Wicksteed’s  work is also important  because of his considerable 
influence on L. Robbins who was one of the first theorists to set the  
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methodological framework for a normative free economic science. The current 
methodological stance of normative free economic theory is based  to a large 
extent on Robbins’ influence. This paper will discuss Wicksteed’s views 
concerning the role of  philosophical and psychological elements in 
economics, his economic methodology,  the classical physics ideal and the 
use of mathematics, and his views on the concept and use of economic man. 
Thus, the first part of the paper will discuss Wicksteed’s ideas on the role of 
normative elements in economics. The following part will concentrate on his 
approach to economic methodology. In the subsequent two sections, the 
paper will examine Wicksteed’s  conception of economic man and the  
influence of his views especially on the work of L. Robbins. A concluding 
section will close the paper. 
 
II. The Role of Normative Elements 
 
Wicksteed’s economic ideas are presented in his two most important 
works, the Alphabet of Economic Science and the Common Sense of Political 
Economy. His economic thought  was in line with the general theoretical 
framework of marginalism and especially with Jevons’ approach. Wicksteed 
was a great enthusiast of Jevons’ ideas and his aim was the application and 
the extension of the marginalist framework to day-to-day decision making (see 
also Flatau, 2004 and for an opposite but minority view which sees Wicksteed 
far less connected to Jevons’ thought, Comim, 2004). His economic analysis 
is conducted in terms of marginal utility but the use of mathematics is not as 
extensive as in Jevons’ work. As Paul observes: “He expressed Jevons’  
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complex formulas in ordinary language, thus rendering them accessible to 
those less schooled in advanced mathematics“ (Paul, 1979).  As we shall see, 
his main economic arguments, developed in his most important works, are 
essentially in line with the marginalist theoretical framework.  
The economic approach of the marginalist school and especially that of 
Jevons, Walras and Edgeworth  was explicitly rooted in the utilitarian calculus 
of Bentham, or more generally in psychological hedonism. Jevons clearly 
states that his purpose was to ‘treat Economy as a Calculus of Pleasure and 
Pain” (Jevons, 1871, p.vii). The theory of exchange equilibrium developed by 
Walras requires agents to “attain maximum satisfaction” (Walras, 1874, 
p.125). In the same climate, Edgeworth thinks that the “Principles of Greatest 
Happiness, Utilitarian or Egoistic constitute the first principles of Ethics and 
Economics” (Edgeworth, 1881, p.v). It is clear that these authors were not 
methodologically concerned about the apparent presence of utilitarian and 
hedonistic concepts and assumptions in their theoretical formulations (for an 
extensive  discussion see Drakopoulos, 1991).  
However, Wicksteed is aware of the  role of normative or philosophical  
concepts in marginalism and particularly in Jevons’ work. More specifically, he 
realizes that hedonism with its central idea of pleasure maximization and pain 
minimization, has had a crucial influence on the marginalist approach (see 
also Drakopoulos, 1992). His anxiety about the obvious role of hedonism in 
marginalist formulations leads him to a deliberate attempt towards 
downplaying hedonistic underpinnings.  Thus, in his Common Sense and 
following some sections where he describes the basic elements of the 
marginalist approach, he feels the obligation to make the following statement: 
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“Nothing that has been said in this chapter must be taken as committing the 
author to a hedonistic theory of ethics (Wicksteed, 1933, p.434).  With the 
same concern in mind, he  devotes a number of pages to an attempt to 
eliminate the role of hedonistic ideas in his work (see Wicksteed 1933, 
pp.431-435). The following passage is in the same tone:  
“It is not my purpose, however, to discuss ethical theories, but merely 
to show that the general  principles on which our investigations are based, 
while throwing light on the hedonistic calculus, do not presuppose a 
hedonistic theory, but are equally applicable to any other” (Wicksteed, 1933, 
p.435). 
In spite of the above qualification though, Wicksteed’s economic 
analysis and most of his examples are presented in terms of pleasure seeking  
and pain avoidance. In an indicative statement which is not too far from moral 
hedonism, he writes: “We must therefore cultivate the power to endure such 
undesired experiences as are unattainable, with the minimum of suffering, 
and to derive the maximum of satisfaction from the realization of things 
desired” (Wicksteed, 1933, p.421, see also similar passages in  Wicksteed, 
1914, pp.774,777). 
  Wicksteed’s distinction between higher and lower pleasures also adds 
a moralistic dimension. It seems that he considers material enjoyments as 
lower pleasures and artistic or spiritual enjoyments as higher pleasures. 
Furthermore, he does not consider as hedonistic the sacrifices and suffering 
that someone might endure for the purpose of some religious or social end 
(see Wicksteed, 1933, pp.431-433). 
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 Wicksteed’s conscious attempt to avoid any connection of his 
economic analysis with a particular philosophical framework (in this case 
hedonism), can also be seen from his explicit and forceful references to 
justice and equality in his non-economic works. For instance, the case for a 
more equal distribution of wealth is made in his The Advent of the People 
(1895). This point can also be reinforced by his other political and religious 
writings where he supports the labour movement and strongly  condemns 
materialism (for a review see Steedman, 1994 and Flatau, 2004).  However, 
these ideas are almost absent in his economic works and this is mainly due to 
his conscious approach of excluding normative elements from scientific 
economic analysis (for an alternative interpretation which argues that 
Wicksteed conceived economics as a moral science, see Comim, 2004). In 
his Battle with Materialism for example, he believes that the role of religion is 
not to interfere with the normal course of scientific endeavour and prescribe 
particular methods and truths (Wicksteed, 1891, p.702). One can also argue 
that Wicksteed’s justification for the rejection of the possibility of interpersonal 
comparisons of utility is to be found in their  lack of scientific foundations. 
Wicksteed believes that “…there is no means of comparing the wants of two 
different minds with each other…” mainly because that will involve “a 
metaphysical scruple or a general vague supposition” (Wicksteed, 1933, 
pp.148-149). 
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III. Economic Methodology 
 
Wicksteed’s influence from positivism was combined with imitation of 
the methodology of physical sciences (for an explicit indication of Wicksteed’s 
influence from the positivism of A. Comte, see Wicksteed, 1906). The physical 
science ideal was extremely influential among the first  and the second 
generation marginalists (with the notable exception of Marshall). Jevons’ close 
analogy of the theory of economy with the science of statical mechanics and 
Walras’ analogy between astronomy and mechanics to mathematical 
economics are representative examples  (Jevons, 1871, p.viii, Walras, 1874, 
pp.47,48). Furthermore, Edgeworth’s parallel between “Mecanique Celeste” 
with “Mecanique Sociale”  and Fisher’s analogy between mechanics, 
hydrodynamics and economics, are also in the same methodological 
framework (Edgeworth, 1881, p.12; Fisher, 1892,pp.85,86).   
Wicksteed’s methodological approach to economics is also in the same 
conceptual structure. In particular,  the physical science ideal is present in his 
economic works. In his Alphabet, he compares the analysis of total and 
marginal utility to the projection of a body upwards at a given velocity. The 
curve which demonstrates the connection between height and time 
corresponds to the curve which demonstrates the connection between total 
satisfaction derived from a given good and the quantity of the good 
(Wicksteed, 1888, pp.2-15). In the same tone, and in a subsequent article on 
Jevons’  ideas, he uses the physics analogy again. Wicksteed attempts to 
illustrate Jevons’ theory of total and marginal utility by using diagrams from 
the field of dynamics. His simplification approach consists of using the 
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diagrams and the formulas of the acceleration of a falling body corresponding 
to marginal utility theory (Wicksteed, 1889).  The physics scientific ideal is 
repeated in another  article for the Palgrave dictionary. More precisely: 
 
“The physicist may, according to his convenience, represent the height of a 
projectile –a magnitude of one dimension –by a line, or by an area, and speed 
by a line or an inclination. So the economist may represent a magnitude 
measured by a complicated derived unit by a line, or a magnitude measured 
by a fundamental unit by an area or a solid” (Wicksteed, 1894a, p757). 
 
The physics methodological ideal was combined with the use of 
mathematics in economics (although not to the same extent as in Jevons’ 
work). In both of his main books, Wicksteed attempts to present important 
economic ideas in mathematical form. For instance, in his Alphabet, the utility 
theory of value is presented in mathematical terms (see also Flatau, 2004). 
He even provides an outline of basic mathematical tools necessary for the 
exposition of marginalist theory (Wicksteed, 1888). In this respect, he followed 
the methodological views of Jevons concerning the role of mathematics in 
economics (Jevons, 1905 and for an analytical treatment of  Jevons’ use of 
mathematics and its wider implications for the development of economics, see 
Schabas, 1990). 
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IV. Economic Man 
 
Wicksteed’s conception of economic man is quite complex and in some 
respects different from the rest of marginalists. First of all,  Wicksteed’s views 
concerning the methodological nature  of economic man are not in line with 
mainstream marginalism. The new element that can be found in his work is 
the rejection of the concept of fictional economic man. This stance was mainly 
based on his interpretation of  positive economic theory. More specifically, 
Wicksteed thought that an economic science that does not include all 
psychological considerations and has no universal laws cannot be a positive 
science. He believes that all psychological considerations that actually bear 
upon the production and distribution of wealth must be included in economics 
if it is to become a positive science (Wicksteed, 1894b, p.770). This attitude 
can be traced to the considerable influence of positivism in social sciences 
(for a review, see Caldwell, 1982 and Redman, 1993). In the same spirit, he 
insisted that economic laws were not an exclusive set of rules which apply 
only to the economic behaviour of human beings, but that their validity was of 
a general nature. As he states: 
 
This brings the economic conduct of man under the same laws as his conduct 
in general, and promises to give us the wider basis of which we are in search 
(Wicksteed, 1894b, p.771). 
 
The above view is at odds with the established line of marginalism that 
considered economic laws as dealing with a specific domain of human 
 10 
activity. Wicksteed’s main source of inspiration, Jevons, referred to the 
existence of higher motives and thus economic man was conceived  only as a 
partial picture of human behaviour (Jevons, 1871, p.31 and Bensusan-Butt, 
1978, p.128). Walras also distinguished between “homo oeconomicus” and 
“homo ethicus”  thus admitting the partial character of economic man 
(Bensusan-Butt, 1978, p.129). However,  Wicksteed was explicitly against the 
concept of fictional economic man: “the psychological law that dominates 
economics dominates life” (Wicksteed , 1914, p.780). As he writes: 
 
“We have now to ask further, are these psychological data, whether facts or 
principles, to include all the psychological considerations that actually bear 
upon the production, distribution etc., of wealth, or are we artificially to simplify 
our psychology and deal only with the motives supposed to actuate the 
hypothetical ‘economic man’? In the latter case political economy will be a 
hypothetical science. In the former it will aim at positivity” (Wicksteed, 1894b, 
p.770) 
 
It is clear that this approach places him in full opposition to line of thought  
originating from J.S. Mill’s concept of hypothetical economic man and to the 
fictional economic man of many marginalists (see also Blaug, 1980). In fact, 
as far as this issue is concerned, he is closer to the viewpoints of Senior and 
Marshall. Senior  did not accept Mill’s fictional economic man, but held that 
the model of economic man was also a description of man’s actual behaviour 
(see Senior in Bowley, 1967, p.61). In the same tone, Marshall includes all 
motives which act with force and regularity. As he writes “In all this we deal 
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with man as he is: not with an abstract or ‘economic’ man; but a man of flesh 
and blood”. (Marshall, 1890 p.27) 
The rejection of fictional economic man and the inclusion of all motives 
in Wicksteed’s  concept of economic man, implies a close connection 
between  economics and psychology. More precisely : 
 
“…the relation of psychology to economics will be as close as that of 
mathematics to mechanics, though not in all respects analogous to it“ 
(Wicksteed, 1894b, p.767) 
 
This belief can also be seen from the following passage: 
 
The laws of political economy then, being ultimately laws of human conduct, 
are psychical and not physical; and therefore psychology enters into political 
economy on something more than equal terms with physical science and 
technology. (Wicksteed, 1894b, p.767) 
 
The role of psychology in economic analysis is not only nominal but for 
Wicksteed is essential in formulating economic laws (see also Comim, 2004, 
p.486). For instance, one of the most important economic laws, the law of  
diminishing marginal utility is based on a psychological law: 
 
 “The whole theoretic study of consumption can be little else than the 
application of the great psychological law of diminishing returns of satisfaction 
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or relief to successive increments of commodity or service supplied to the 
same subject.” (Wicksteed, 1894b p.767) 
 
It must be emphasized here that for Wicksteed, psychology was a 
perfectly legitimate scientific discipline and thus he saw no obstacle for 
economics to use its  concepts  and findings. This is contrary to the views of 
many of Wicksteed’s contemporary and subsequent theorists who did not 
advocate any connection of psychology to economics. I. Fisher for instance, 
believes that  “It is not his [the economist’s ] province to build a theory of 
psychology (1892, p.11). The same attitude  can be found in Robbins (1932, 
p.84) and in  Samuelson’s Foundations (1963, p.91). (For a detailed 
discussion of the emergence of anti-psychologism in economics, see Coats, 
1976 and Bruni and Sugden, 2007.) 
 Wicksteed’s views on economic man are closely connected with his 
conception of human rationality. He maintains that human decisions are 
mainly rational, and that rational considerations are carried out unconsciously. 
He proceeds to provide examples of ordinary behaviour which display 
unconscious rationality when undertaking decisions: “A girl is conscious of 
choosing between a number of hats in a shop, but she may hardly be 
conscious of choosing between a hat and something else…[but] gets the best 
she can afford” (Wicksteed, 1933, p.35). He concludes “but to say that all this 
is merely to say that our scale of preferences often asserts itself 
automatically” (Wicksteed, 1933, p.35). It has to be pointed here that his use 
of the term scale of preferences was to become basic in the subsequent 
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theory of consumer behaviour. In another passage he points out the 
underlying rationality of decisions: 
 
“That is to say, if we are moderately wise we pretty generally act without 
reflection in the manner which reflection would have dictated” (Wicksteed, 
1933, p.36) 
 
In short, although he expresses some reservations about the correctness of 
these decisions, Wicksteed holds that in general, human behaviour is rational.  
 Selfish behaviour was another central characteristic of marginalist 
homo oeconomicus.  Wicksteed however, adopts a different approach from 
the other marginalists. This was part of his effort to distance marginalist 
economics from the normative framework of selfish utility maximization. In 
particular, he believes that  selfish and altruistic behaviour are both equally 
acceptable in the economic domain. Furthermore, he condemns the exclusion 
of altruistic motives from previous marginalist economists (Wicksteed, 1933, 
p.179). Wicksteed believes that limiting economics to one particular motive, 
‘the desire to possess wealth’, has prevented economic science from evolving  
(Wicksteed, 1933, p.163). His own attempt to include non-selfish motives in 
economics is quite interesting. He argues that in business transactions and 
especially in bargaining situations, agents might think of their interests (ego) 
or of the interests of others (family, friends: alteri) but they do not think of the 
interests of the trading partner (tu). Thus, according to this approach, the 
specific characteristic of an economic relation is not its ‘egoism” but its “non-
tuism” (Wicksteed, 1933, p.180). This elaboration of the selfish behaviour 
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does not prevent him from stating that after all “altruism has no place in 
business and non-tuism is equivalent to egoism” (Wicksteed, 1933, p.180). It 
seems that for Wicksteed the nature of economic relation determines whether  
non-selfish considerations appear. As was the case in his discussion of 
hedonism,  Wicksteed’s concern to include non-selfish motives in economic 
behaviour,  was another indication of his attempt to  shield economics from 
criticism of being a science based on egoism (see also Bruni, 2000).  A 
detailed analysis of  Wicksteed’s approach on this issue can be found in  
Steedman  (1989) and also Fontaine (2000). 
  
V. Wicksteed’s Influence on Robbins 
 
Wicksteed’s ideas on the role of normative issues, and his economic 
methodology influenced to a great extent the views of L. Robbins (see also 
O’Brien, 1990 and Howson, 2004). Robbins’ work “An Essay on the Nature 
and Significance of Economic Science” (1932) has had a considerable impact 
on the development of  mainstream economic methodology. Robbins was a 
great admirer of Wicksteed and this can be seen from his edition with an 
extensive introduction of “The Common Sense” and a number of Wicksteed’s 
essays. He also acknowledged his intellectual debt to Wicksteed in his 
autobiography (Robbins, 1971, p.146). Robbins realized the influence of 
hedonism in marginalist economics, but  similarly to Wicksteed, he believed 
that hedonism was incidental to the main structure of the theory (Robbins, 
1932, pp.85-86). As he writes: 
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“Thus, from a very early stage, we find explanations that utility is not utility in 
the sense of psychological hedonism, but rather a neutral quality of being the 
object of desire, whether hedonistic or otherwise” (Robbins, 1970, p.27) 
 
Robbins gives credit to Wicksteed for  allegedly having expelled hedonism 
from economics. The following quotation is indicative: 
 
“Before Wicksteed wrote, it was still possible for intelligent men to give 
countenance to the belief that the whole structure of Economics depends 
upon the assumption of a world of economic men, each actuated by 
egocentric or hedonistic motives…Wicksteed shattered this misconception 
once and for all.” (Robbins, in the Introduction to Wicksteed, p.xxi). 
 
In the same spirit, his influential definition of economics in terms of 
ends and scarce means is given as a normative free definition. This definition 
is connected to the physics ideal that we also observed in Wicksteed (for 
further evidence of Robbins’ influence from the method of physics, see 
Howson, 2004). As Robbins notes: 
“In pure Mechanics we examine the implication of the existence of 
certain given properties of bodies. In Pure Economics we examine the 
implication of the existence of scarce means with alternative uses (Robbins, 
1932, p.83) 
Furthermore, Robbins’  rejection of the idea of interpersonal 
comparisons is justified in terms of  lack of scientific foundations (Robbins, 
1938, p.640). As was mentioned before, this was the basic reason of 
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Wicksteed’s rejection of the idea. In addition, Robbins  points out that 
Wicksteed had also rejected the assumption of interpersonal comparisons of 
utility “as early as 1888” (Robbins, in the Introduction to Wicksteed, p.xvii). 
However, Robbins does not agree with Wicksteed’s  conception of economic 
man as describing actual behaviour.  
 
“If this were commonly known, if it were generally realized that 
Economic Man is only an expository device –a first approximation used very 
cautiously at one stage in the development, of arguments which, in their full 
development, neither employ any such assumption nor demand it in any way 
for justification of their procedure- it is impossible that it would be such a 
universal bogey.” (Robbins, 1932, p.90). 
 
Furthermore, Robbins does not share Wicksteed’s concerns about 
selfish behaviour since there is no discussion of Wicksteed’s novel concept of 
non-tuism  (see also Bruini, 2000, p.302). In the same framework, Robbins is 
also opposed to Wicksteed’s conviction that economics should adopt findings 
from psychology. As he states: “I doubt whether anything which has yet been 
written by psychologists has the slightest value for  the economist” (quoted in 
Howson, 2004, p.430). Thus, it can be argued that the current anti-
psychologism of many contemporary economists can also be attributed to 
Robbins’ methodological stance on this issue. 
 Robbins seems to have taken on board most of the points relating to 
Wicksteed’s conception of the nature of economics that we discussed. In 
particular, Robbins accepted Wicksteed’s idea of hedonism as incidental to 
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economic theory, the physics methodological ideal for economics, the non-
scientific nature of interpersonal comparisons and in general the  need for 
disassociation of economics from any philosophical or ethical framework.  
 
 
V. Concluding Comments 
 
Normative issues, and especially influences from utilitarianism and 
hedonism, were explicitly present in the economic works of many leading 
marginalists and especially of Jevons, Walras, and Edgeworth. Wicksteed, the 
main disciple of Jevons and a popularizer of marginalism, was not very 
content with such influences. Thus he was anxious to disassociate marginalist 
economic theory from utilitarianism and hedonism. This is mainly due to his 
influence from positivism that  demanded the exclusion from economics of all 
normative/philosophical elements. Wicksteed’s adherence to the positivist 
methodology for economics can also be seen form his economic methodology 
where the physical science scientific ideal combined with use of mathematics, 
were central. Furthermore, Wicksteed’s conception of economic man was in 
the same positivist climate. He thought that economic man was not a fictional 
construction, but a representation of actual behaviour and that its 
psychological characteristics were based, or should be based on, sound 
scientific  findings from psychological research.  
Although Wicksteed’s influence as an economist was not as great as 
that of major marginalists, his  approach on the role of normative elements 
became dominant in the subsequent treatments of those issues. This was 
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mainly achieved through Robbins’ work who was much influenced by the 
ideas of P. Wicksteed. Some important elements of Wicksteed’s economic 
methodology such as his non-hypothetical economic man and his pro-
psychologism, were not accepted by Robbins. The main reason for this was 
the mathematical attraction of a relatively simple model of individual economic 
behaviour based on selfish utility maximization. However, many of Robbins’s 
influential ideas on economic methodology such as the rejection of hedonism  
and of interpersonal utility comparisons stem directly  from Wicksteed’ work.  
Thus, some, but not all, of Wicksteed’s important views concerning the nature 
and method of economics became quite  dominant among subsequent 
economists albeit indirectly through his influence on L. Robbins. 
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